Terrorism and counter-terrorism in Xinjiang, China

Uighurs and China's Xinjiang Region

Preeti Bhattacharji
Council on Foreign Relations
Friday, August 1, 2008; 9:20 AM

Introduction

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), a territory in western China, accounts for one-sixth of China's land and is home to about 20 million people from thirteen major ethnic groups. The largest of these groups is the Uighurs [PRON: WEE-gurs], a predominantly Muslim community with ties to Central Asia. Some Uighurs call China's presence in Xinjiang a form of imperialism, and they stepped up calls for independence -- sometimes violently -- in the 1990s through separatist groups like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The Chinese government has reacted by promoting the migration of China's ethnic majority, the Han, to Xinjiang. Beijing has also strengthened economic ties with the area and tried to cut off potential sources of separatist support from neighboring states that are linguistically and ethnically linked with the Uighurs.

Intermittent Independence

Since the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, Xinjiang has enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy. Turkic rebels in Xinjiang declared independence in October 1933 and created the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (also known as the Republic of Uighuristan or the First East Turkistan Republic). The following year, the Republic of China reabsorbed the region. In 1944, factions within Xinjiang again declared independence, this time under the auspices of the Soviet Union, and created the Second East Turkistan Republic. But in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party took over the territory and declared it a Chinese province. In October 1955, Xinjiang became classified as an "autonomous region" of the People's Republic of China.

Some Uighurs, nostalgic for Xinjiang's intermittent periods of independence, call for the recreation of a Uighur state. "The Central Asian Uighurs know a great deal about the two East Turkestan periods of sovereign rule, and they reflect on that quite frequently," says Dru C. Gladney, president of the Pacific Basin Institute at Pomona College. Many of these Uighurs say China colonized the area in 1949. But in its first white paper on Xinjiang, the Chinese government said Xinjiang had been an "inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation" since the Western Han Dynasty, which ruled from 206 BC to 24 AD.

Economic Development

Xinjiang's wealth hinges on its vast mineral and oil deposits. In the early 1990s, Beijing decided to spur Xinjiang's growth by giving it special economic zones, subsidizing local cotton farmers, and overhauling its tax system. In August 1991, the Xinjiang government launched the Tarim Basin Project (World Bank) to increase agricultural output. During this period, Beijing invested in the region's infrastructure, building massive projects like the Tarim Desert Highway and a rail link to western Xinjiang. In an article for The China Quarterly, Nicholas Bequelin of Human Rights Watch says these projects were designed to literally "bind Xinjiang more closely to the rest of the PRC."

Since 1954, China has also used the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) to build agricultural settlements in China's western periphery. Locally known as the Bingtuan, the XPCC is charged with cultivating and guarding the Chinese frontier. To achieve this mission, the corps has its own security organs, including an armed police force and militia. Over the past fifty years, the XPCC has attracted a steady stream of migrant workers to Xinjiang.

Beijing continues to develop Xinjiang in campaigns called "Open up the West" and "Go West." These economic programs have been relatively successful: Xinjiang has become one of the wealthiest parts of China."If you look at the general per capita income of Xinjiang as a region, it's higher than all of China's except for the southeast coast," says Gladney. International development bodies like the Asian Development Bank say that despite Xinjiang's growth, there are high levels of inequality (PDF) in the area. But the Chinese government has launched a series of programs to alleviate poverty in Xinjiang, and in March 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao emphasized harmonious development of the region in a government report.

Han Migration

Growing job opportunities in Xinjiang have lured a steady stream of migrant workers to the region, many of whom are ethnically Han. The Chinese government does not count the number of workers that travel to Xinjiang, but experts say the local Han population has risen from approximately 5 percent in the 1940s to approximately 40 percent today. These migrants work in a variety of industries, both low tech and high tech, and have transformed Xinjiang's landscape. In June 2008, the BBC produced a photo report called Life in Urumqi, which said Xinjiang's capital had recently witnessed "the arrival of shopping centres, tower blocks, department stores and highways."

In its 2007 annual report to the U.S. Congress, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China said the Chinese government "provides incentives for migration to the region from elsewhere in China, in the name of recruiting talent and promoting stability" (PDF). Since imperial times, the Chinese government has tried to settle Han on the outskirts of China to integrate the Chinese periphery. But the Communist Party says its policies in Xinjiang are designed to promote economic development, not demographic change. Xinjiang's influx of migrants has fueled Uighur discontent as Han and Uighurs compete over limited jobs and natural resources.

Ethnic Tension

The Chinese government says Xinjiang is home to thirteen major ethnic groups. The largest of these groups is the Uighurs, who comprise 45 percent of Xinjiang's population, according to a 2003 census. Like many of these groups, the Uighurs are predominantly Muslim and have cultural ties to Central Asia.

As Han migrants pour into Xinjiang, many Uighurs resent the strain they place on limited resources like land and water. "Uighurs feel like this is their homeland, that these resources should be more devoted to them," says Gladney. In 2006, Human Rights in China said population growth in Xinjiang had transformed the local environment, leading to "reduced human access to clean water (PDF) and fertile soil for drinking, irrigation and agriculture."

Ethnic tension is fanned by economic disparity: the Han tend to be wealthier than the Uighurs in Xinjiang. Some experts say the wage gap is the result of discriminatory hiring practices. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China reports that in 2006, the XPCC reserved approximately 800 of 840 civil servant job openings for Han. Local officials say they would like to hire Uighurs, but have trouble finding qualified candidates. "One common problem of the western region is that the education and cultural level of the people here is quite low," said Wang Lequan, Xinjiang's Communist Party secretary, in an interview with the BBC. Gladney says Han applicants tend to have better professional networks because they are more often "influential, children of elite Party members and government leaders."

According to Bequelin, Uighurs are also upset by what they consider Chinese attempts to "refashion their cultural and religious identity." In an op-ed for the Washington Post, Rebiyah Kadeer, a prominent exiled Uighur, condemns China for its "fierce repression of religious expression," and "its intolerance for any expression of discontent." Beijing officials respond to these accusations by saying they respect China's ethnic minorities, and have improved the quality of life for Uighurs by raising economic, public health, and education levels in Xinjiang.

Terrorism and Counterterrorism

During the 1990s, separatist groups in Xinjiang began frequent attacks against the Chinese government. The most famous of these groups was the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). China, the United States, and the UN Security Council have all labeled ETIM a terrorist organization, and Chinese officials have said the group has ties to al-Qaeda. Concern about Uighur terrorism flared in July 2008 -- two weeks before the Beijing Olympics -- when a group calling itself the Turkistan Islamic Party took credit for a series of terrorist attacks (Xinhua), including two bus explosions in Yunnan province.

The Chinese government has taken steps to combat both separatists and terrorists in its western province. According to the U.S. State Department, Chinese authorities raided an alleged ETIM camp in January 2007, killing eighteen and arresting seventeen. China also monitors religious activity in the region to keep religious leaders from spreading separatist views. Since September 11, 2001, China has raised international awareness of Uighur-related terrorism and linked its actions to the Bush administration's so-called war on terror.

But many experts say China is exaggerating the danger posed by Uighur terrorists. China has accused the Uighurs of plotting thousands of attacks, but Andrew J. Nathan, chair of the political science department at Columbia University, says, "You have to be very suspicious of those numbers." Gladney notes that many of the "terrorist incidents" that China attributes to ETIM are actually "spontaneous and rather disorganized" forms of civil unrest. Most experts say ETIM has no effective ties to al-Qaeda, and Bequelin goes so far as to say, "ETIM is probably defunct by now, as far as we know." In a 2008 report, Amnesty International accused Chinese officials of using the war on terror to justify "harsh repression of ethnic Uighurs." But in Xinhua, a state-run newspaper, Chinese rights organizations refuted the Amnesty report, saying it was designed to slander China under the pretense of human rights.

Experts disagree on the efficacy of China's counterterrorism measures. Some, including Bequelin, say China's anti-separatist campaign actually provokes more resentment, which can lead to more terrorism. But other Western outlets say China's counterterrorism measures have been relatively successful. A review of U.S. State Department documents shows a decrease in Uighur-related terrorism since the end of the 1990s.

Tough Neighborhood

Xinjiang shares a border with Mongolia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Because of the Uighurs' cultural ties to its neighbors, China has been concerned that Central Asian states may back a separatist movement in Xinjiang. According to Nathan, these fears are fueled by the fact that the Soviet Union successfully backed a Uighur separatist movement in the 1940s. To keep Central Asian states from fomenting trouble in Xinjiang, China has cultivated close diplomatic ties with its neighbors, most notably through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. According to Bequelin, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was created "to ensure the support of Central Asian states," and to "prevent any emergence of linkages between Uighur communities in these countries and Xinjiang."

Many experts believe China's diplomatic efforts have been successful. Adam Segal, senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, says China's neighbors "are now fighting their own Muslim fundamentalist groups," which makes them more sympathetic to China's plight. According to the U.S. State Department, Uzbekistan extradited a Canadian citizen of Uighur ethnicity to China in August 2006, where he was convicted for alleged involvement in ETIM activities. Nathan says cases like these are evidence that China's neighbors are cooperating with China's anti-secessionist policies. In contrast, the United States refused to hand over five Uighurs who had been captured by U.S. forces in Pakistan in 2001, despite Chinese calls to do so. After their release from Guantanamo Bay in May 2006, the Uighurs were instead transferred to Albania.

None of China's neighbors have expressed official support for the Uighurs, but the region's porous borders still worry Chinese officials. In the 1980s and 1990s, many Uighurs traveled into Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they were exposed to Islamic extremism. "Some enrolled in madrassas, some enrolled with [the anti-Taliban opposition force] the Northern Alliance, some enrolled with the Taliban, some enrolled with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," says Bequelin. Chinese officials worry that militants who slip in and out of Xinjiang can promote anti-state activity.

International Disinterest

In the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008, protests in Tibet reaped international attention. But protests in Xinjiang (IHT) went relatively unnoticed. "People aren't threatening to boycott the Olympic opening ceremony for the Uighurs," says Segal. Because Tibet gets more global attention than Xinjiang, some reporters have referred to Xinjiang as "China's other Tibet" (al-Jazeera).

International interest in Xinjiang is muted for a variety of reasons. According to Nathan, the Uighur community lacks an effective leader. "For the Uighurs, their most prominent spokesperson is Rebiya Kadeer in Washington, who really doesn't have the infrastructure and the Nobel Prize that the Dalai Lama has," he says. Bequelin adds that the Chinese government has effectively branded Uighur separatists as terrorists, which has reduced international sympathy for their mission. Amidst international apathy, most experts say the human rights situation in Xinjiang is likely to get worse before it gets better. "There's no international pressure to change policy in Xinjiang right now," says Segal. "So why would China make any changes?"

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/01/AR2008080100933_pf.html



From The Times

August 5, 2008
Delicate China
With only four days to the start of the Olympics, China is growing nervous about political challenges from within the country
The deadly attack by Islamist separatists on a police barracks in China's Muslim-majority north west has left the Chinese authorities aghast. Only four days before the start of the Olympics, the daylight bombing of border police, leaving sixteen people dead, seemed to fulfil the warnings given by nervous officials that Uighur separatists would use the Games to attempt a publicity-seeking attack.

For China, the stakes could not be higher. The Olympics in Beijing are planned as the biggest, most lavish, most spectacular ever held. China has poured in huge sums of money, and invested enormous national pride. The Games are seen as a way of showing the world that China is a mighty power and one that has emerged as a global economic powerhouse.

The city of Beijing has been transformed in a way that few other cities have been by the event: daring new architecture dominates the skyline, the infrastructure has been revamped, buildings cleaned, factories relocated or even closed and the city's population given extensive tips, lectures and orders on how to behave.

Patriotism has combined with nervousness to make these Games highly political. It is the first time since the 1980 Olympics in Moscow that they have been staged in a communist country, and the party is determined to show not only that it is in full control but that it runs an effective and popular government. Any challenge, whether political or logistic, therefore assumes unusual importance as it is seen to reflect on the party's boast and on Chinese pride.

Not all has been smooth-running, however. The run-up to the Games has proved increasing vexed for the party as challenges have appeared on all sides. Getting the organisation right has been the least difficult. The environmental problems have proved far harder to resolve, and the cost of a traffic ban and virtual closedown of industry in a desperate attempt to clear the leaden skies will prove enormous.

Western criticism of China's human rights record was probably also expected, and has drawn two contradictory responses. On the one hand, China has attempted to defuse attacks on its foreign policy by taking steps to put pressure on governments in Sudan, Burma and North Korea. On the domestic front, however, it has bristled defiance, cracking down on critics and cutting off websites, only grudgingly restoring some access after Western complaints.

But the bigger challenges have been emotional - the terrible earthquake in May - and political, especially the uprising in Tibet in March. This coincided with the ill-fated Olympic torch relay to cause huge embarrassment and anguish in Beijing, while rallying Han nationalism. Security was stepped up and the authorities realised that the Games had become a target for the demonstrators. For Beijing, the real danger never came from the distant and sparse Tibetan plateau but from a lesser known but far more disaffected region: China's restive Muslim provinces.

The Uighurs of Xinjiang in the far north west are Turkic-speaking Central Asians who have long complained of religious and political oppression under nearly six decades of Chinese Communist rule. Numbering around eight million, they have recently been the target of infiltration and agitation by al-Qaeda and extremist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. Chinese authorities claim to have foiled a series of plots, although a militant group has claimed responsibility for explosions in four cities, including two bus bombings.

The latest attack has put Beijing on full alert. The Olympics will go ahead with panache. But beneath the glitter lurk ingredients all too common nowadays: worry, a security alert and overreaction. The Games come at a high price.



http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article4460667.ece

China changes in the face of foreign religious devils

On December 18, the party's politburo, the highest ruling body in the country, held a plenary collective study session. It was the second one since the 17th Communist Party Congress that ended in October last year. For the first time in the history of the People's Republic, the party's top echelons met to discuss a once-taboo subject - religion.

The Chinese Communist Party, like many other communist parties, is patently atheist, to the point that religious affiliation is forbidden for party members. However, right in Congress there was the first sign that things could be moving in a different direction.

Broadcasting from the cavernous Great Hall of the People in Beijing, where the 17th Party Congress was in session, TV screens showed the slim and attentive face of the young Panchen Lama (the second-highest ranking Lama after the Dalai Lama), who was following the speech of party general secretary Hu Jintao. The badge on his chest said "guest". [...] Indeed, Hu's keynote speech devoted a paragraph to religion [2]. He said religious people, including priests, monks and lay-believers, played a positive role in the social and economic development of China. Furthermore, Hu did not talk about religions as such, thus establishing a form of respect and non-interference in purely religious affairs. That is, the party is not interested in religion per se, but it values the positive social contribution of religious people.

At the study session on December 18, the politburo explored the issue. Two experts introduced the subject. One was Zuo Xinping, a specialist on Christianity from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the other was Mou Zhongjian, a scholar on Confucianism from the Central University of Nationalities in Beijing. It seemed the party wanted two perspectives, one about new Christian faiths coming from abroad and one from the country's own native traditions.

Hu presented some introductory remarks, reported in a Xinhua article in Chinese [3], and it was indeed an historic event. Two facts are extraordinary.

It was the first high-level meeting of the party fully devoted to religion. That was a sign that party leaders recognized the great political significance of religion in building a "moderate, affluent and harmonious society". Religion is no longer an issue of public security that can be handed over to the police - it is a top social and political issue involving all aspects of society, and therefore all politburo members must be aware of it.

Secondly, in all of the Xinhua reports, there were no negative, derogatory remarks about religion, as one would expect to find about the "opiate of the masses". There were not even "ifs" or "buts" to indicate that the party would handle religion with diffidence. The English version stresses that there must be freedom of belief, and in the Chinese version, Hu is quoted as saying that the party must mobilize the positive elements of religion for economic and social development. Thus, religion can play an important role in realizing the "harmonious society" that is the new political goal of the party. [...]

However, Chinese history tells party leaders that religion is also an extremely volatile element. Major uprisings in the past were organized by religious groups. For instance, the Taiping, who almost brought to an end the Qing Dynasty in the 19th century, were pseudo-Christians. Similarly, extreme radical Islam now mobilizes millions worldwide. Religion has to be handled with care, but it cannot simply be ignored or looked down on like some kind of feudal leftover.

"China's massive wrench: Change in the face of foreign devils" (Francesco Sisci), Asia Times Online (03 July 08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JG03Ad04.html

[Rest of this thread at Sunthar V (Jun 6, 2008 )

China's New Confucianism by Daniel A Bell / Reith lectures on China] http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Abhinavagupta/message/4553

Mt. kailas, abode of Shiva; Manasarovar, world's greatest water tower

http://hindutva97.blogspot.com/2008/06/mt-kailas-abode-of-shiva-manasarovar.html

Mt. kailas, abode of Shiva; Manasarovar, world's greatest water tower

Thanks to Tarun Vijay ji for this exquisite article. The abode of Shiva is Mt. Kailas. At the foothills of this stunner is Manasarovar glacier, which is the world's greater tower in the Himalayas yielding glacier melts which service 10 of the greatest perennial rivers of the world. This water tower, if managed well, can make every river in Bharatam a jeevanadi, and in the process help create a National Water Grid which will be a revolution for abhyudayam of Bharatam -- adding 9 crore acres of additional wet land with assured irrigation and over 60,000 kms. of national waterway, complementing the highway-railway networks. So, a form of Shiva is a S'ivalingam as the metaphor for the summit of Mt. Kailas, the water-giving divinity, devatatmaa himalaya; hence, the perpetual abhishekam in the jyotirlinga sthalams in Bharatam venerating the water-giving, life-giving Mahes'wara, paramaatman.

This is the cultural capital of Bharatam. Ask China to vacate Tibet.

Kalyanaraman

Abode of the gods

June 20, 2008



As devotees prepare for the arduous annual trek to Kailas Manasarovar, Tarun Vijay reflects on that most sublime of spiritual experiences -- a pilgrimage to Shiva's home.

A group of atheists had accompanied us during an earlier pilgrimage to Kailas Manasarovar. I still recall them standing, frozen in place by their first glimpse of Mount Kailas; I saw tears of pure joy running down their faces -- and I was not surprised.

If there is one place on this planet where God can be touched and felt, it has to be the Kailas Manasarovar region -- it is indescribable, beyond the power of words to capture; it is perhaps the one experience that defines the state of being.

The trek is often called a pilgrimage, but it is so much more -- the fulfillment of a dream, a realisation of life's highest aspirations. People let themselves in for uncertainty, for incredible hardship, year after year because they know that what is in store for them is not simple anand, joy, but sachidanand, sublime joy.

It is for this experience that people wait a lifetime, offering up prayers to god to grant them an opportunity to go on this journey of self-realisation. That is one of the unique aspects of this trek -- unlike routine pilgrimages to even venerated sites, which you make when you want to, the trek to Kailas is not about your schedule. Trite though it seems to say this, the 'call' has to come; for some, it never does during their lifetimes; for others, who dream of this for years, suddenly it all falls into place and often in completely unexpected fashion, they find themselves readying for an experience they have dreamt about. I had the good fortune to get such a 'call', to go on a pilgrimage that brought me such bliss at the time, and that now feels like a dream.

Image: For pilgrims, this first frontal view of the legendary abode of Lord Shiva is the culmination of a lifetime's hopes and dreams.

The MEA has made this year's yatra possible

June 20, 2008



When news appeared earlier this year that China has cancelled this year's yatra, thus, it cast a pall of gloom not merely on those who had planned to make the trek this year, but on the community at large -- for even those who cannot go derive a measure of satisfaction from the knowledge that the experience is there, that others are savoring it, and that sooner or later, their turn will come.

Thanks largely to the efforts of our Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon, the Chinese government has agreed to allow the yatra to proceed in batches, on a revised schedule -- irrespective of the nature of government in New Delhi, our external affairs ministry boasts dedicated officers like Menon, who leave no stone unturned to ensure that the yatra is always on schedule. It needs pointing out that though the Chinese have cancelled all batches originating in Kathmandu, for fear of Tibetan infiltration into the group, they have allowed Indian pilgrims to make the journey.

I guess we need to thank the Chinese for allowing us to continue with our most revered pilgrimage -- though Shiva is a Hindu god, Tibet falls in their territory. Then army chief in Kashmir General Zoravar Singh had tried in 1841 to bring Kailas back to India; he in fact won the first phase of the battle and annexed the Kailas Manasarovar region into Maharaja Ranjit Singh's territory - but then winter intervened, and the enemy got the better of him in the treacherous climate.

Such was his bravery, however, such the heroism he displayed before dying in battle, that the Tibetans were moved to build a monument for him at Toya village near the Kailas route, adjoining Taklakot. The flag that General Zoravar Singh's soldiers brought back from Tibet is called the flag of Mantalai (Manasarovar), and forms part of the glorious heritage of the Jammu Kashmir Rifles. A military fort near Leh has also been named after General Singh.

Image: Clouds that shround the north face of Mount Kailas shift, in answer to pilgrims' prayers, to afford a clear view.

The quest for salvation

June 20, 2008

It takes two days to complete the 54-kilometre long parikrama (circumambulation) of Kailas -- 24 hours of immersing yourself in the spirituality that envelops this abode of Shiva, God of Gods. To the south of Kailas is Lake Manasarovar, whose circumference of 90 kilometres can be circumambulated in two days. The Tibetans call the lake Tso Mapham or Tso Mawang.

To the south of Manas is the Gurla Mandhata mountain named after Mandhata, a great king of yore who reportedly did penance here. The region finds numerous mentions in Indian scriptures, in the Ramayan and Mahabharat. The great poet Kalidasa beautifully described Kailas and Manasarovar in his masterpiece Kumarsambhavam: 'In the northern part there is a mighty mountain by name Himalaya -- the abode of perpetual snow -- fittingly called the Lord of mountains, animated by Divinity as its soul and internal spirit; spanning the wide land from the eastern to the western sea, it stands, as it were, like the measuring rod of the earth. At the direction of King Prithu, the selfsame mountain was used as a calf by all other mountains, while Mount Meru (Kailas) stood as an expert milker of cows and milched from Mother Earth the milk of shining gems and medicinal herbs of wonderful virtue and supreme efficacy.'

Image: Pilgrims on yaks make the two-day parikrama of Mount Kailas.

None to equal that transcendent moment when you stand at the threshold of Shiva's abode

June 20, 2008



Of all the many memories pilgrims carry away, and nurse for a lifetime, there is none to equal that transcendent moment when you stand at the threshold of Shiva's abode. I remember my own experience as if it were yesterday: The sun shone bright and high in the clearest blue sky I had ever seen. The peak of the holy mountain, alone, was shrouded in clouds, like a white silken curtain.

We were a group of 30 pilgrims, who came out of our base camp rooms to offer obeisance to the mountain. With folded hands and prayers on our lips, we waited for the clouds to move away -- and in that icy cold silence, pierced only by the prayers of the pilgrims, magic happened. The clouds suddenly moved away, and Mount Kailas appeared in full majestic effulgence, even as our voices rose in the chant of the Mahamrityunjay, the supreme mantra of victory over death.

You felt the tears roll down your faces; you looked around, and realized that everyone was crying in sheer bliss. There were some who said they had waited through several lifetimes for this chance to stand, head bowed in veneration, before the 22,028 feet high Mount Kailas, abode of Lord Shiva and the 'Navel of the Earth'.

Tarun Vijay, director, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation, is the author of books on Kailas Manasarovar, available in English, Hindi, Gujarati and Marathi.

Image: On the Chinese side of the pilgrimage, the signs of Indian culture are everywhere.

http://specials.rediff.com/news/2008/jun/20sld4.htm

Dalai Lama 'selling out' Chinese territory?

http://www.c3sindia.org/tibet/259/china-dalai-lama-accused-of-%e2%80%9cselling-out%e2%80%9d-chinese-territory-with-intention-to-sow-discord-in-sino-indian-relations/

China: Dalai Lama accused of “selling out” Chinese territory with Intention to Sow Discord in Sino-Indian Relations

D.S.Rajan,

C3S Paper No.169 dated June 11, 2008

Reacting to Indian press reports (4 June 2008) about the statement made for the first time by the Dalai Lama that the “McMahon line”, fixed by the 1914 Simla Convention is legal and accordingly, “ Arunachal Pradesh” including Tawang, is a part of India, a report in the People’s Daily- affiliated Global Times (Chinese language, 10 June 2008), recalled that the Indian Government ‘forcibly occupied’ the Chinese territory south of “McMahon line” in 1951 and formed “Arunachal Pradesh” in 1987. According to the Chinese paper, the Indian despatches contrasted the present statement with the evasive reply given by the exiled leader on the subject earlier in 2003 during his visit to Tawang, saying merely that “Arunachal Pradesh” is a de facto part of Tibet, along with the remark that what the spiritual leader has said now, can certainly influence the Sino-Indian border talks.

Global Times quoted an authoritative India specialist associated with the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Professor Sun Shihai, as saying to the paper’s correspondent that the change in the attitude of “Dalai” on “Arunachal Pradesh” reflects the fact that the “ Tibet Independence” forces are facing bad days more and more, in the background of improving Sino-Indian relations. The change has more or less brought out the “worries” on the part of such forces, as China and India get closer. The Olympic torch could pass through India and New Delhi arrested the ‘head of the Tibet independence organisation’. No activity of “Tibet Independence” forces can influence the overall situation in Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese scholar asserted that on Sino-Indian border talks, the “Dalai” cannot represent anybody and that the change in his attitude, will not affect that talks.

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has described the Tibet issue as a ‘sensitive’ one in Sino- Indian ties. Beijing reportedly took up the issue of the Dalai Lama’s ‘free use’ of the Indian media, when India’s Minister for External Affairs visited China recently. Now comes the Chinese allegation, perhaps for the first time in recent years, on the exiled leader’s ‘sowing discord’ in Beijing-New Delhi relations. Beijing’s motives are not difficult to see – it intends to apply more and more pressure on the Dalai Lama to accept Central Government’s conditions for dialogue as well as give a subtle warning to New Delhi about the risks for bilateral relations coming from any encouragement under the pretext of democracy, to what it feels, the ‘anti-China’ activities of the Dalai Lama and his followers in India. Secondly, Beijing seems to be trying to kill two birds with one stone- using the attack on the Dalai Lama to drive a wedge between him and the Indian Government as well as to reinforce its claim on Arunachal Pradesh.

Interestingly, the latter is being carried out through an unending publicity drive and it is happening at a time when New Delhi is taking care to use every occasion to satisfy China by declaring that the Tibet Autonomous Region is an integral part of China. Obviously, China, for its own reasons, does not feel any necessity to maintain restraint in reciprocation to such attitude of India.

The recent Tibet unrest is widely being seen outside China as a factor, which could contribute to erosion of China’s bargaining position in the border talks with India. Adding strength to such views, are the Dalai Lama’s latest observations on Arunachal, which may find acceptance of the Tibetan population inside China. Contrary to what China is telling, it should therefore be Beijing, which should “worry” about what the Dalai Lama has said.

(The writer, D.S.Rajan, is Director of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai,India, Email:dsrajan@gmail.com)

China’s nuke arsenal targets India and Russia; Free Tibet.

China’s nuke arsenal targets India and Russia; Free Tibet.

India’s strategic, forein-policy pundits to note and introspect: one reason why India should ensure Tibet’s independence.

Do the pundits know that Tibet has been nuclearised already? Why do you think Chinese chose to occupy the roof of the world? To save on lift-off height for their nuke-tipped missiles.

Read on…

Kalyan

Michael Arnold Says:
May 15th, 2008 at 10:42 am

This a serious issue United States should keep a close eye on, it could be military exercise, or movement of missile locations, or new launch sites. A show of strength to the United States intentionally, to set the intelllegence agency off. Your call.

Reply: I see this differently. First, deployment of DF-21 at Delingha and Da Qaidam is neither new nor does it affect the United States directly. The sites are for targeting Russia and India. Besides, these deployment areas have been known to U.S. intelligence analysts for year; the “new” is that it is now possible for the public to “look over their shoulder” and make up its own ideas about what this means. HK (hkristensen)
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/extensive-nuclear-deployment-area-discovered-in-central-china.php

India in China's nuke crosshairs
17 May 2008, 0049 hrs IST , Rajat Pandit , TNN


NEW DELHI: China has more worrying news for us. Latest satellite pictures have identified a large area in central China with 58 launch pads for nuclear-capable ballistic missiles which apparently target north India and south Russia.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/photo.cms?msid=3047537
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/_images/deployment.jpg

Coming soon after the discovery of the sheer extent of China's underground nuclear submarine base at Hainan Island in South China Sea, it's yet another reality check for the Indian defence establishment.

TOI had highlighted earlier this month how Hainan had jolted the Indian establishment, with navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta expressing concern about the number of nuclear submarines and long-range missiles "in our neighbourhood".

The new satellite pictures show 58 launch pads and command and control facilities spread over a 2,000 sq km deployment area near Delingha and Da Qaidam in the northern parts of Qinghai province.

An analysis of the photos by the Federation of American Scientists, a reputed US non-governmental organization which works on nuclear and arms control issues, holds "the sites are for targeting Russia and India".

But while China has been swift to resolve disputes with Russia, even importing weapon systems worth an estimated $13 billion from Moscow in the last seven-eight years, it continues to adopt an aggressive border posture as far as India is concerned.

Moreover, Russian missiles and counter-missile measures are more than a match for the Chinese ones. In sharp contrast, India has stark asymmetry vis-a-vis China in terms of strategic and military capabilities.

"It's foolhardy for India's political leadership to assume all is hunky-dory with China by citing the $40 billion bilateral trade figure. With the boundary dispute showing no signs of being resolved amid tussle for energy resources, China clearly remains India's long-term threat," said an official.

Though India has steadily improved its relationship with China, with several military CBMs being implemented along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control, the armed forces remain concerned about Beijing's "continuing deep linkages" with Islamabad in the nuclear and missile arenas.

Tibet build-up, PLA modernization cause for worry

Moreover, there is worry about the rapid modernization of the 2.5-million strong People's Liberation Army, with its active nuclear submarine, missile and anti-satellite weapon programmes, as also the real intentions behind the massive build-up of military infrastructure in Tibet.

The FAS analysis of the deployment area near Delingha and Da Qaidam, done by Hans M Kristensen, on its part, says, "From these launch pads, DF-21 missiles would be within range of southern Russia and northern India (including New Delhi), but not Japan, Taiwan or Guam."

Kristensen writes that deployment of the solid-fuelled DF-21 medium-range nuclear missiles at the sites has been known to the US for some time now. And India and Russia have more to worry from the development since it does "not affect the US directly".

The US, of course, is more anxious about the new Chinese road-mobile DF-31A missiles, which can hit targets 11,200km away, and the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which have a reach beyond 7,200-km. Pentagon, on its part, has dubbed China "the country with the greatest potential to compete militarily with US".

Incidentally, India and US had come together last year to discuss China's massive military modernization and its spreading arc of influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

India wants to be viewed as a "neutral" player rather than being projected as a counterweight to China or being an "axis of democracy" to "contain" China. India is now taking some steps to build a "minimum credible nuclear deterrent" against China. The China-specific 3,500-km range Agni-III missile, however, will be ready for operational deployment only by 2010 or so, with the 5,000-km Agni-V getting ready for its first test around the same time.

rajat.pandit@timesgroup.com


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-3047524,prtpage-1.cms

Extensive Nuclear Missile Deployment Area Discovered in Central China
Posted By hkristensen On May 15, 2008 @ 7:00 am In China, Hans Kristensen, Nuclear Weapons, United States | 3 Comments


More than 50 launch pads for nuclear ballistic missiles have been identified scattered across a 2,000 square kilometer (772 square miles) area of central China, according to analysis of satellite images. Click image for full size. Also download GoogleEarth KMZ file.

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By Hans M. Kristensen
Analysis of new commercial satellite photos has identified an extensive deployment area with nearly 60 launch pads for medium-range nuclear ballistic missiles in Central China near Delingha and Da Qaidam.
The region has long been rumored to house nuclear missiles and I have previously described some of the facilities in a report and a blog. But the new analysis reveals a significantly larger deployment area than previously known, different types of launch pads, command and control facilities, and missile deployment equipment at a large facility in downtown Delingha.
The U.S. government often highlights China’s deployment of new mobile missiles as a concern but keeps the details secret, so the discovery of the deployment area provides the first opportunity for the public to better understand how China operates its mobile ballistic missiles.

Description of Deployment Area
The deployment area is located in the northern parts of the Qinghai province and consists of two areas west of Delingha and Da Qaidam. In total, 58 launch pads have been identified scattered over an area stretching roughly 275 kilometers (170 miles) along highway G315 leading from Delingha through Da Qaidam to Mahai (see banner image for details). Nearly all launch pads detected so far are located on the north side of the road. Combined, the deployment area covers approximately 772 square miles (2,000 square kilometers).
Figure 1:
Delingha Deployment Area


36 launch pads and the 812 Brigade Base have been identified in and around Delingha. Click on image to see full size
The Delingha (德令哈) deployment area stretches approximately 52 kilometers (32 miles), covering 1,000 square kilometers (386 square miles) west of the city of Delingha (see Figure 1). A total of 36 launch pads have been identified along three side roads extending north from the main road. The three strings of launch pads are separated by 16-20 kilometers (10-12 miles). This area appears to be very active with missile operations detected in 2005 and 2007, and several facilities in downtown Delingha associated with missile operations are identified below.
Figure 2:
Da Qaidam Deployment Area


22 launch pads have been identified northwest of Da Qaidam. Click on image for full size
The Da Qaidam deployment area stretches for more than 100 kilometers (62 miles) west of the city of Da Qaidam Zhen all the way past Mahai, covering an area of 1,100 square kilometers (424 square miles). A total of 22 launch pads have been identified alongside and to the north of the main road (see Figure 2). This deployment area shows clear wheel tracks at several of the pads, including what might be construction of new pads or maintenance of existing ones. Unlike in Delingha, no missile related facilities have yet been identified in or around Da Qaidam itself, except for what appears to be a surface-to-air missile (SAM) site in the city itself and what might be a command and control facility further south near Xiao Qaidam.
There are probably more launch pads and facilities between Delingha and Mahai, but satellite photos of a couple of areas are not yet available on Google Earth.
From these launch pads DF-21 missiles would be within range of southern Russia and northern India (including New Delhi), but not Japan, Taiwan or Guam.
Figure 3:
Launch Pad Designs


Four basic launch pad designs have been detected ranging is size from 15-70 meters.
Launch Pad Designs
The 58 launch pads include four basic designs: a 70-meter full circle; a 40-meter T-shape, a 15-45 meter rectangular, and a 30-meter pull-out (see Figure 3). The 15-meter rectangular is by far the most common design. There are two full circle pads and four T-shape pads.
The large circular pads are probably older designs for the liquid-fuel DF-3 and DF-4, which require a large number of fuel trucks on the pad until shortly before launch. The liquid-fuel missiles are now being phased out and replaced with the solid-fuel DF-21 and DF-31, which require fewer support vehicles. The DF-31 has not been reported in the Delingha and Da Qaidam areas, but its smaller predecessor the DF-21 has deployed there for several years and can be launched from the small 15-meter pads. Two of the pads in Figure 3 show what are estimated to be DF-21 launchers, a 2006 deployment previously described here.
The pads could potentially also be used by short-range missiles such as the DF-11 and DF-15. But the DOD has repeatedly stated in its annual reports on China’s military that “all of [China’s] SRBM units are deployed to locations near Taiwan.”
Several of the smaller 15-meter launch pads appear to have a small infrastructure consisting of a tiny building located approximately 150 meters from the pad. A few also have larger structures nearby.
Command and Control Facilities
The satellite photos also show what appear to be buried command and control (C2) facilities at each deployment area. They are hard to find because they blend in with the other pads, but a closer look reveals that they are very different and so far two have been detected (see Figure 4).
The two C2 facilities have the same dimensions, 20 x 16 meters, and each has a tall antenna at either end of what looks like a concrete pad. The pads might cover buried facilities used for C2, or be used by C2 vehicles that deploy with the missile launcher.
The facilities face the same direction, and lines drawn from each antenna parallel to the end of the facilities run through Delingha as well as Wulan (Ulan) further to the southeast, a rumored location of the headquarters for the missiles in this area.
Figure 4:
Command and Control Facilities


Two of the pads (sites A4 and D1) have twin antennae and appear to be command and control facilities.
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Likewise, a string of facilities with antennae south of Da Qaidam near Xiao Qaidam might also be related to command and control operations.
Missile Activities Downtown Delingha
Traveling through Delingha a few years ago, a group of hikers described the encounter: “While trying to find accommodation we got stopped by police, one of them did some cell phoning and then offered to find a hotel for us, we were impressed! Once in the hotel there was a knock on the door- and we were confronted with ‘Alien Police’ who informed us we were in a closed city where no foreigners were allowed.”
Whether the hikers were deported because Delingha houses a nuclear missile brigade is unknown, but in the past it has been difficult to identify facilities in the city related to missile operations. A satellite photo taken on February 28, 2008, however, shows structures similar to those observed on remote launch pads outside the city in 2005 and 2006. The structures can be seen at three locations inside a 1.5 x 0.5 kilometer (0.7 x 0.3 mile) compound (see Figure 5), and appear to reveal the location of the 812 Brigade Base Headquarters for the first time.
Figure 5:
812 Brigade Base in Delingha


Missile related facilities and equipment reveal the location of the 812 Brigade Base in downtown Delingha. Click on the image for full size.
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A square fenced section in the western part of the base compound is dominated by two large c-shaped structures. Closer inspection reveals that they consist of five tent-like structures, two of which are about 70 meters long and three that are 40 meters. At the end of the two larger tents is what appears to be a gate or portal. Next to the tents are two small buildings and a truck (see Figure 6).
Figure 6:
Possible Missile Launch Brigade Tents


Tent-like structures visible in downtown Delingha appear to be used by the missile launch brigade when it deploys to remote launch pads (see also Figure 7).
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These structures are hard to identify by themselves, but when comparing with earlier satellite photos from the same area they become significant because they are very similar – if not identical – to structures seen on dispersed launch pads near Delingha in 2005 and 2006. Two of those cases are reproduced in Figure 7, showing an 80-meter tent, 43 crew tents/huts, a gate, and six fuel trucks at Launch Pad B1 in 2005, as well as a DF-21 launcher with a crew tent/hut at Launch Pad B10 in 2006.
Figure 7:
Possible Missile Launch Brigade Tents


Tent-like structures similar to the ones detected in downtown Delingha (see Figure 6) were deployed to missile launch pads in 2005 (right) and 2006.
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At the eastern end of the compound is another large open facility with what appears to be camouflage nets covering unidentified vehicles. The relatively low resolution of the photos conceal many details, and it’s difficult to say whether they are vehicles or stacked equipment, how long they have been there, and whether they’ve just arrived or are being shipped out. Yet their sizes (27-56 meters) and shapes are particularly interesting because the length of the DF-21 launcher is approximately 13 meters and the DF-31 launcher is about 23 meters. At the south end of this facility are two large buildings that might be service garages for missile launchers (see Figure 8).
Figure 8:
Camouflaged Mobile Launchers?


Equipment similar in size to launch platforms is covered by camouflage nets. Two buildings at the south end of the facility resemble service buildings for launchers.
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Immediately to the west of this facility, separated by a canal, a triangle-shaped section of the main compound appears to be associated with servicing the missile units and their equipment. Clearly visible are several tents of the same basic design as those seen in the western facility and on launch pads, as well as three smaller huts and the shadow of what seems to be a gate/portal (see Future 9).
Figure 9:
Possible Missile Brigade Service Section


Tent-like structures, red huts, and a gate/portal similar to those observed at launch sites B1 and B5 in 2005 and 2006 identify this section of the Delingha base as a possible service facility for mobile ballistic missile launchers.
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Implications of a Mobile Missile Force
The current head of China’s Second Artillery Corps, General Jing Zhiyuan, reportedly served as commander of the Second Artillery Base 56 in Xining, the headquarters for the Delingha missile brigade, from 1993 to 1997. As such he would have overseen the preparations for the transitioning from old liquid-fuel missiles at Delingha and Da Qaidam to solid-fuel missiles.
This change, one all the other nuclear powers made decades ago, is in full swing through the Chinese missile force. Several of the small pads detected at Delingha and Da Qaidam have been added since 2005. At that time approximately 33 of China’s deployed 91 ballistic missiles were solid-fuel, corresponding to 36 percent. Today the share is 67 out of 121 deployed missiles, or 55 percent. The share will increase in the next several years as more DF-31s and DF-31As are deployed and the DF-3As and DF-4s are retired. JL-2 missiles on Jin-class submarines will increase the percentage even more.
Similarly to the other nuclear weapon states, China is trying to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear deterrent, and much of the debate about the new mobile missiles centers on their ability to disperse and launch quickly, making them harder for others to destroy. The small 15-meter launch pads are indeed easy to overlook compared with the larger 70-meter pads, and it is not known which of he pads will be used by launchers in a war; they might even be capable of launching from the main road. The tire tracks visible in the images and the absence of paved roads to most of the launch pads suggest the DF-31 launchers have some off-road capability.
Even so, the relatively low-resolution satellite images show that even mobile missile leave fingerprints such as tire tracks and rely on a highly visible infrastructure that includes the launch pads themselves, command and control facilities, and bases. Moreover, targeting Chinese mobile systems is far from a new and untested challenge for U.S. military planners because China and Russia have deployed - and the United States has routinely targeted - their mobile ballistic missiles since the early 1980s. Indeed, the DOD’s determination that all of China’s smallest mobile missile units - those that are hardest to detect and the most numerous - are confined to one region and nowhere else in this vast country suggests that a considerable detection (and thus targeting) capability exists today.
Mobile missiles might make it more difficult to carry out a successful first strike to destroy all of the launchers, but it doesn’t make the force invulnerable. If hidden inside a cave it is relatively simple to seal off the entrance and trap the launchers inside. Once out in the open mobile launchers can move and try to hide, but they are highly vulnerable to the blast effect of a nuclear weapon. The specific targeting and damaging requirements for U.S. nuclear forces tasked with targeting Chinese mobile missiles are not know. But the following excerpt from The U.S. Nuclear War Plan: A Time For Change (NRDC 2001, p. 54) about targeting Russian mobile SS-25 ICBMs might be a good illustrative example for targeting Chinese mobile missiles as well:
“The 1969 Defense Intelligence Agency Physical Vulnerability Handbook—Nuclear Weapons assigns a vulnerability number of 11Q9 to road-mobile missiles with ranges of 700, 1,100, and 2,000 nautical miles or with intercontinental ranges. The damage level for this vulnerability number is defined as “transporter overturned and missile crushed.” The kill mechanism has been likened to flipping a turtle on its back. For a 100-kt weapon [the W76], the optimum height of burst to attack a target with a vulnerability number of 11Q9 is approximately 1,250 m (no local fallout would be expected), and the corresponding damage radius is 2,875 m. Thus dispersed SS-25 vehicles can be threatened over an area of approximately 26 square kilometers by a single W76 air burst. If, for example, a MAZ vehicle is traveling at 20 kilometers per hour, then one W76 explosion must occur within about 15 minutes of noting the location of the moving vehicle. While this time interval is roughly consistent with depressed-trajectory launches of SLBMs, it would require additional time to communicate the SS-25 locations to the SSBNs and retarget the missiles. The fact that Trident I or Trident II SLBMs are MIRVed, with up to eight [now estimated to be six] warheads per missile, means that a group of moving SS-25 launcher vehicles could also be pattern-attacked with W76 warheads over an area of some 200 square kilometers.”
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Using this example as a guide, it would require at least 24 100-kiloton W76 warheads - the load of four Trident II D5 missiles - detonating at a height of burst of 1,250 meters to ensure destruction of all the 58 launch pads identified in these satellite images, plus several more warheads to destroy the bases. Rather than aiming at each pad, warfighters would more likely try to hit the launchers before they dispersed.
The mobile nuclear cat and mouse game is on: Chinese planners are trying to hide and U.S. and Russian planners are trying to catch them.
Additional information: Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning | GoogleEarth KMZ File
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Article printed from FAS Strategic Security Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp
URL to article: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/05/extensive-nuclear-deployment-area-discovered-in-central-china.php

China's strike hard policy in Tibet: Srikanth Kondapalli

China's strike hard policy in Tibet

Srikanth Kondapalli | April 25, 2008 | 16:28 IST

China's response to the Tibetan uprising in the last one month has been harsh and appears to be following the previous policy of "strike hard" to snuff out any dissent for its rule in Tibet and other portions of the country. As indicated by events in the capital city of Tibet, Lhasa on March 14 and other places, this policy is likely to be continued further in the run-up to the Olympics in August and after.

However, given the widespread response of the Tibetans within Tibet and outside and the groundswell of support from different governments and civil society groups in the world, the entire issue is turning out to be a foreign policy failure in the making for China. A majority in the foreign policy establishment of China appears to be now geared towards curbing the negative fallout arising out of the Tibetan protests.

China did make frantic efforts in reaching out to different "allies and friends" in the aftermath of March 14. However explicit support to Beijing came from only a few countries such as Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Venezuela, Latvia, Malaysia, Singapore and others, while several countries have expressed reservations on Beijing's handling of the Tibet issue.

If the effort of bidding and conducting Olympics is to showcase China's rise to the world, popular indictments at the global and Tibetan levels have unnerved Beijing. For so long Tibet is considered to be the minimalist foreign policy position for China, while the Olympics indicated its bidding for global legitimacy for its policies.

In the initial official rhetoric, the Chinese government critiqued the Dalai Lama as the one who had 'organised, premeditated, masterminded and instigated' uprising in Lhasa on March 14.

While the Dalai Lama denied such charges, nevertheless, there appears to be a disjuncture in the Tibetan movement inside Tibet as compared to protests outside. For, one of the main demands of the Tibetans in Tibet is not related to Olympics but to oppose the Chinese government's plan to relocate nearly three million Han Chinese and Muslims in Lhasa and the deteriorating unemployment situation for Tibetans in Tibet. Rising unemployment among the Tibetans, despite the Chinese government showcasing Tibet as a favourable business destination, is also mentioned frequently as one of the main grievances of those who have participated in the Tibetan uprising.

Also, after the Tibetan movement spread to other parts of China, specifically in traditional Tibetan areas such as Amdo (Qinghai Province) and Kham (now integrated into Sichuan province), and to other parts of the globe (such as in the protests against the Olympics torch at London, Paris, San Francisco, New Delhi, Jakarta, Bangkok, Canberra, Tokyo and other places), the Chinese official criticism is now directed against Tibet Youth Congress, instead of targeting the Dalai Lama alone.

On April 10, for instance, the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, carried reports suggesting that Tibet Youth Congress 'is no different from Al-Qaida, Chechnyan armed terrorists, East Turkistan separatists and any other terrorist organisation'. This political line appears to be intensified by the Chinese government in the run-up to the Olympics and after in order to drive a cleavage in the Tibetan community -- pitching the TYC against the Dalai Lama.

Nearly, five decades of Chinese rule in Tibet contributed to the emergence of pro-Chinese Communist Party section within Tibetans. This section has been co-opted into the decision-making process in Tibet, although high-level posts are still are in the hands of Han-ethnic persons. These sections of Tibetan cadres are also pitched to be in the forefront of resistance against the Dalai Lama and Tibetans living abroad.

These sections have much to lose (as with the Han leaders) if the Tibetan conflagration goes beyond China's hand. Mutual symbiosis between the two then is the emerging glue and acts as a powerful force at the disposal of the Chinese government. Thus, when the Chinese government stated, in the aftermath of the March 14 incident, that it would wage a "people's war" against the independent forces in Tibet, the people here are those who are co-opted by the Chinese system in Tibet.

China is also changing its tactics in the current imbroglio. Unlike in the 1959 and 1989 uprisings, the Chinese leadership in the current case is pitching Han-nationals against Tibetans. Packaging the Olympics as a part of the 'national rejuvenation and glory' and any efforts to block such sport events as 'politicisation' or even efforts to deny China its due place 'under the sun', the leadership is mobilising Han nationals against Tibetan 'sabotage', thus deflecting the global attention on the central Tibetan issue of identity and autonomy.

Differences in the Chinese leadership are likely to become more explicit in the coming months in terms of handling the Tibet issue. While Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Li Keqiang are considered to be in league in the nine-member Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party along with another member Zhou Yongkang the internal security minister in overall-charge, including Tibet, all eyes will be on the rising star of the party Xi Jinping for his views on the subject.

Xi, who was named as the vice president of China recently, had indicated during his tenure in Fujian Province that reform and opening up is essential for China and that he is favourably disposed towards commercial contacts. The post Olympics situation is likely to usher in acute debates within the Communist Party, much like during the Tiananmen Square incident two decades ago. Although the bottom line is to retain Tibet in China, methods to resolve the perennial Tibetan unrest could intensify internal political debates in the party.

As a reflection of the above, internal changes in Tibet have already commenced. Although official rhetoric of China continued to be critical of 'the Dalai clique' for instigating violence in Lhasa, quietly internal changes commenced in Tibet -- indicating to the central government reprisals on Tibetan officials. After nearly a fortnight of the March 14 incident in Lhasa, the Chinese government sacked Danzeng Langjie, director of Tibet's Ethnic Minority and Religious Affairs Commission. He was replaced by Luosang Jiumei, vice secretary of the Communist Party committee of Lhasa since 2004. More heads are likely to roll.

Srikanth Kondapalli is associate professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University

URL for this article:
http://www.rediff.com//news/2008/apr/25guest.htm

Doublespeak by Marxists: Balbir K. Punj

Doublespeak by Marxists
By Balbir K. Punj


The better part of the world has condemned China’s violation of human rights and deprivation of democracy for the Tibetans. In every country that enjoys freedom of expression, local people have joined Tibetans to protest against the Beijing Olympics as a way of bringing to international notice the cause of Tibet. So widespread and deep is the condemnation of China and sympathy for the Dalai Lama and his supporters that the Olympic torch had to avoid public exposure in places like San Francisco, London and Paris. In New Delhi, the torch procession was a sham.

The French President is among those who have decided not to attend the opening ceremony of the Olympics in Beijing. Even those who are attending are not hiding their displeasure at China. But our “China patriots” would not give up. CPI(M) central committee member Nilotpal Basu not only defends China’s Tibet policy but even draws a comparison between Tibet and Kashmir. He claims that the charge that China is violating human rights in Tibet is from the same quarter that blamed India for human rights violations in Kashmir and was not prepared to accept India’s claim over the Valley.

Confronted on the issue of not letting Tibetans choose their government, the Marxist leader claims that there are different perceptions of democracy. Mr Basu defends China by arguing that all countries have accepted Tibet as an integral part of China while they have not given similar acceptance to the Indian claim over Kashmir. Therefore, he says, China has a better claim to reject the global protests over Tibet.

Earlier, party boss Prakash Karat had defended China on Tibet; Speaker Somnath Chatterjee too had dismissed the Tibetan issue as China’s internal matter, thereby affirming his old Marxist loyalty. Significant in the Marxists’ doublespeak on the Tibet-China issue is the absence of even a word of condemnation of China on appropriating a section of Kashmir extending up to 5,800 sq. km in the Shaksgam valley along the Karakoram range with the connivance of Pakistan.

At this juncture, one recalls the notorious comment of Jawaharlal Nehru’s defence minister then and crypto-Communist V.K. Krishna Menon that this is an area where “not a blade of grass grew.” This reveals the pattern in the Marxist mind: China is always right because it is a Communist country and India is wrong. And these are the knights who in their recent political resolution projected themselves as the defenders of national sovereignty. The Marxists conveniently forget that the core issue in Tibet is not the acceptance of the area as part of China but the denial of basic rights of Tibetans in their own country.

The wave of protests last month within Tibet brought to the world’s notice the fact that Tibetans resent the “Hannisation” of Tibet. Eyewitness accounts trickling out of Tibet by independent travellers from different countries have exposed the Chinese move to crush local culture and change demography by importing large numbers of ethnic Chinese natives into that area.

Therefore, the Marxists’ attempt to draw a comparison with Kashmir is totally misleading. In Jammu and Kashmir, only the local people can acquire and hold property. Besides people there enjoy special rights under Article 370 of the Constitution. What the world has accepted regarding Tibet is that it is, as the Chinese themselves describe it, “an autonomous region of China.” The world now wants to know: Where is the autonomy? A bulk of Tibetans, including their acknowledged spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, are outside of that plateau in other countries.

The Dalai Lama has publicly expressed his willingness to accept the position for his country as an autonomous region — as per the Nehru-Zhou Enlai agreement of 1958. But China refuses to respond to the offers that the Dalai Lama makes. Tibetans do not rule this autonomous region; Chinese do. Even Chinese President Hu Jintao was once the Chinese commissar in Tibet. There is no scope for political expression for Tibetans in their own country. And yet China wants the world to believe otherwise.

What the Chinese Communists deny the Tibetans in Tibet brings us to the type of regime Communists everywhere impose on people they govern. This is not surprising. As the ruling party in West Bengal the CPI(M) has built a formidable fortress where incursions by any other political activist is met with instant punishment. The breach in this fortress occurred first in Singur and then in Nandigram. The violence that was witnessed at both the places, particularly at the latter, was an index of the Marxist concern. Similar things are now taking place at Kannur in Kerala, another Marxist fortress.

While on Tibet, two more things should be noted. One, the way the fellow travellers in Nehru’s entourage tricked India into signing for recognition China’s “sovereignty” on Tibet. The agreement between India and China during the 1950s was actually for recognising China’s “suzerainty” over Tibet. But the draft of the subsequent treaty that the foreign office in New Delhi sent to the Indian ambassador in China, Sardar K.M. Panikkar, changed this word into “sovereignty.”

Panikkar was agitated and wrote to the foreign secretary K.P.S. Menon. But he was asked to shut up and get the Chinese officials’ signature. The Indian foreign office at that time was under two influences — K.P.S. Menon and V.K. Krishna Menon. K.P.S. Menon later became a Soviet lobbyist in India heading the Indo-Soviet friendship setup and was a frequent visitor to Moscow.

The criticism then that Jawaharlal Nehru failed to bring up the pending questions on the border between India and China and get a quid pro quo from Zhou Enlai for accepting China’s claim over Tibet was dismissed. The second point is that the same Communists who dismiss Tibetans’ agony as China’s internal matter and want India not to support the Dalai Lama are all too eager to uphold mass killers like Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, the Iranian establishment and the former Taliban government of Afghanistan.

When it comes to Palestine, the Communists urge the government to turn against Israel, which supplies us a whole range of defence technologies and weapons, and support the terrorist elements among the Palestinians whom their own elected President wants to bring under control. The Iraqi leader who used chemical gas to exterminate thousands of Kurds is their favourite, not the Dalai Lama. Is there a limit to doublespeak?

http://deccan.com/Columnists/Columnists.asp?#Doublespeak%20by%20Marxists